Optimal Climate Policy When Damages are Unknown by Rudik, Ivan
Economics Working Papers
11-13-2016
Working Paper Number 16011
Optimal Climate Policy When Damages are
Unknown
Ivan Rudik
Iowa State University, irudik@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_workingpapers
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Climate Commons, Natural
Resources Management and Policy Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, ethnicity, religion, national origin, pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender
identity, genetic information, sex, marital status, disability, or status as a U.S. veteran. Inquiries regarding non-discrimination policies may be directed to
Office of Equal Opportunity, 3350 Beardshear Hall, 515 Morrill Road, Ames, Iowa 50011, Tel. 515 294-7612, Hotline: 515-294-1222, email
eooffice@mail.iastate.edu.
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please visit
lib.dr.iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rudik, Ivan, "Optimal Climate Policy When Damages are Unknown" (2016). Economics Working Papers: 16011.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_workingpapers/16
Optimal Climate Policy When Damages are Unknown
Abstract
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are economists' primary tool for analyzing the optimal carbon tax.
Damage functions, which link temperature to economic impacts, have come under fire because of their
assumptions that may produce significant, and ex-ante unknowable misspecifications. Here I develop novel
recursive IAM frameworks to model damage uncertainty. I decompose the optimal carbon tax into channels
capturing parametric damage uncertainty, learning, and misspecification
concerns. Damage learning and using robust control to guard against potential
misspecifications can both improve ex-post welfare if the IAM's damage function is misspecified. However,
these ex-post welfare gains may take decades or centuries to arrive.
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Climate | Natural Resources Management and Policy | Public
Economics
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_workingpapers/16
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2516632 
Optimal Climate Policy When Damages are Unknown
Ivan Rudik∗
Department of Economics and Center for Agricultural and Rural Development
Iowa State University
479 Heady Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, 50011-1070, USA
irudik@iastate.edu
November 13, 2016
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are economists’ primary tool for analyzing the op-
timal carbon tax. Damage functions, which link temperature to economic impacts, have
come under fire because of their assumptions that may produce significant, and ex-ante
unknowable misspecifications. Here I develop novel recursive IAM frameworks to model
damage uncertainty. I decompose the optimal carbon tax into channels capturing paramet-
ric damage uncertainty, learning, and misspecification concerns. Damage learning and using
robust control to guard against potential misspecifications can both improve ex-post welfare
if the IAM’s damage function is misspecified. However, these ex-post welfare gains may take
decades or centuries to arrive.
JEL: H23, Q54, Q58
Keywords: climate, integrated assessment, damages, deep uncertainty, robust control,
sparse grid, learning, social cost of carbon, carbon tax
∗This paper was originally circulated as “Targets, Taxes, and Learning: Optimizing Climate Policy Under
Knightian Damages.” I am immensely grateful for advice and support from Derek Lemoine. I also benefited
from comments and discussions with Dave Kelly, Lint Barrage, Stan Reynolds, Alex Hollingsworth, Price
Fishback, and Quinn Weninger as well as participants at the Western Economics Association Meeting,
the SCRiM Summer School, the CU Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop, The Heartland
Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop, The AERE Summer Meeting, The Occasional Workshop
in Environmental and Resource Economics, The Research Frontiers in the Economics of Climate Change
Workshop, The University of Arizona, The University of Miami, and Iowa State University. Funding from
The University of Arizona GPSC Research Grant is gratefully acknowledged.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2516632 
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are economists’ primary tool for analyzing the opti-
mal carbon tax. IAMs are macroeconomic models linked to a climate module by the “damage
function,” which translates rising temperature into economic losses.1 The world’s true un-
derlying damage function is complex and characterized by deep uncertainties stemming from
a lack of knowledge of how warming will affect natural and economic systems. In order to
develop tractable models in the face of these unknowns, integrated assessment modelers have
been forced to pin down the damage function with strong assumptions. Alongside the dis-
count rate, the damage function is one of the most contentious feature of IAMs. In fact,
some economists have suggested abandoning quantitative integrated assessment because of
the alleged arbitrariness of the damage assumptions underpinning it (Pindyck, 2013).
Rather than abandoning the quantitative integrated assessment agenda that has proved
useful for analysis and policymaking, I integrate uncertainty and even skepticism about
damages into the benchmark DICE integrated assessment model. I advance methodology by
incorporating uncertainty and Bayesian learning about the damage function. I also imple-
ment robust control, a macroeconomic technique, to account for concerns from economists
and scientists that the damage functional form is misspecified. Using these methodological
advances, I aim to ascertain the policy and welfare implications of: (1) accounting for para-
metric uncertainty over the damage function calibration, (2) including endogenous damage
learning in a manner that closely matches how real world modelers update damage func-
tions, (3) allowing the policymaker to distrust her model via the use of robust control, and
(4) interacting learning with the policymaker’s distrust of her own model.
Similar to approaches in the savings literature (e.g., Gollier, 2004), I decompose the op-
timal carbon tax into different channels representing the policy implications of uncertainty
and learning, and I present a novel channel representing concerns about model misspecifica-
tion. I find that subjective uncertainty over how the damage function is calibrated generally
decreases the optimal carbon tax, however concern for model misspecification can flip the
sign of this effect. The other uncertainty channels and the misspecification concern chan-
nel are analogous to precautionary savings and insurance motives in the savings literature.
These channels tend to increase the optimal carbon tax at an increasing rate over time as
the Earth warms and future damages appear more variable.
Even when the policymaker has misspecified the damage function, updating its calibration
can lead to substantial ex-post welfare gains over a wide range of time horizons compared to
1This is specific to the benchmark DICE model. Other IAMs, such as FUND, may have explicit impacts
of CO2.
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not updating damage beliefs. Using robust control to guard against model misspecification
can also improve welfare; however its benefits are realized far in the future, so net welfare
gains relative to only acknowledging the uncertain damage calibration may not be achieved
for decades or centuries.
Damage functions have garnered substantial criticism that may lead a policymaker to
distrust damage functions in IAMs. Some economists have noted that IAMs do not account
for a variety of potential damage channels (Howard, 2014), that the studies used to calibrate
the damage function underestimate the actual impact of warming (Hanemann, 2008; Howard
and Sterner, 2014), and that integrated assessment modelers have imposed strong, arbitrary
functional form assumptions (Pindyck, 2013). Recent work analyzing the sensitivity of the
optimal carbon tax to both the functional form and calibration of the damage function has
demonstrated that errors in the damage function have non-trivial policy impacts (Stanton
et al., 2009; Kopp et al., 2012; Weitzman, 2012).2 Addressing these issues is critical since
IAMs have become a key component of determining environmental regulation. For instance,
a suite of IAMs is currently being used by the U.S. government to price greenhouse gas
emissions in cost-benefit analyses of federal policies (Greenstone et al., 2013).
The weaknesses of current damage functions and uncertainty about the economic conse-
quences of additional warming indicate that damage uncertainty should be explicitly cap-
tured in modeling. Damage uncertainty has been included only recently in IAMs (Crost and
Traeger, 2013, 2014), however the recursive IAM literature, which uses dynamic program-
ming approaches to better represent decision making under uncertainty, is relatively new.
It has mostly focused on policy and learning when the sensitivity of the climate system to
CO2 is uncertain (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Leach, 2007; Kelly and Tan, 2015; Fitzpatrick
and Kelly, 2016; Lemoine and Rudik, 2017), when there are tipping points or irreversibilities
(Lemoine and Traeger, 2014; Cai et al., 2015a,b; Lontzek et al., 2015; Lemoine and Traeger,
2016a,b), or to examine the implications of solar geoengineering (Heutel et al., 2015, 2016).3
Robust control has also been applied recently to examine the effects of model misspec-
ification concerns in environmental and integrated assessment contexts (Roseta-Palma and
Xepapadeas, 2004; Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas, 2012; Anderson et al., 2014; Temzelides
2Economists often analyze warming risk, captured by climate sensitivity uncertainty. Damage uncer-
tainty is less studied, but there is evidence that it has greater policy implications than warming uncertainty
(Lemoine and McJeon, 2013).
3The recursive IAM literature expands on an expansive set of previous works that approximates uncer-
tainty using Monte Carlo methods (Hope, 2006; Stern, 2006; Nordhaus, 2008; Ackerman et al., 2010; Kopp
et al., 2012). Lemoine and Rudik (2017) provide a discussion and theoretical examples showing that Monte
Carlo analyses are not equivalent to a dynamic programming approach.
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et al., 2014). I build upon these strands of existing work by realistically capturing uncer-
tainty, learning, and misspecification concerns in a recursive integrated assessment setting.
To perform this analysis I integrate the benchmark DICE model into a dynamic program-
ming setting that trades off near-term costs of emissions reductions with the future benefits
of lower temperature via reduced damages in four different frameworks.
In order to develop these frameworks I must introduce additional state variables for
the policymaker’s beliefs and the stochastic realizations of damages. I exploit sparse grid
methods which provide an accurate and computationally cheap way to substantially in-
crease the number of states in dynamic stochastic IAMs. I use the original methodology of
Smolyak (1963), and advances by Judd et al. (2014), to construct a sparse collocation grid
for value function approximation. This methodology results in computational complexity
increasing only polynomially in the number of states rather than exponentially (Winschel
and Kratzig, 2010). This method has been applied recently in the macroeconomics literature
to compute equilibria in overlapping generations models (Krueger and Kubler, 2004) and to
solve stochastic growth models (Gonzalez and Rojas, 2009). This affords major increases in
computational efficiency for high dimensional problems. This work appears to be the first
application of this powerful computational technique in the environmental literature, which
opens up new avenues for research in climate modeling.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides more background on the construction
of the DICE damage function and an overview of the DICE model and all four frameworks.
Section II describes how to decompose the optimal carbon tax under uncertainty into several
different channels. Section III reports results on how the different frameworks affect opti-
mal policy and ex-post welfare when the damage function may be misspecified. Section IV
concludes. The appendix fully describes the dynamic stochastic DICE model, contains addi-
tional information on robust control, details the computational methodology, and provides
an error and sensitivity analysis.
I Damages and the Integrated Assessment Modeling
Framework
I begin by giving a brief overview of the DICE damage function and its calibration. Next,
I describe the DICE model as a whole and then describe the four frameworks I use to
4Lemoine and Rudik (2017) have subsequently used sparse grid methods and have called for applications
of frontier numerical methods in the integrated assessment literature.
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investigate damage uncertainty, learning, and misspecification concerns through the use of
robust control.
I.I The DICE Damage Function Its Criticisms
In the benchmark DICE model, damages D(T st ), multiplicatively reduce the level of time t
output as a function of the time t surface temperature, T st .
5 The damage function specific
to the DICE model is given by:
D(T st ) = d1 [T
s
t ]
d2 ,
where d2 is set to 2 and d1 is calibrated to estimates of damages from specific levels of
warming over preindustrial levels.
Historically, the damage function has been calibrated in a bottom-up fashion by devel-
oping damage functions specific to different sectors such as health or agriculture, and then
aggregating them up to a global damage function. The most recent version of DICE is di-
rectly calibrated to a set of monetized damage estimates contained in Tol (2009), with an
upward adjustment of 25 percent to account for impacts that are more difficult to estimate
such as human conflict (Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013). Even with this change in the damage
calibration procedure, it does not include damage estimates from a burgeoning strand of
literature that has recently explored many different economic consequences of warming.6
Although the quadratic functional form is calibrated to data, the functional form itself
is not. The quadratic functional form is a critical assumption and has been claimed to lack
economic or scientific grounding (Stanton et al., 2009; Pindyck, 2013). Some scientists and
economists have gone so far as to say the damage function is far removed from evidence in
the natural sciences on catastrophes and impacts (Ackerman and Stanton, 2012; Lenton and
Ciscar, 2012). Yet some assumption on its functional form is necessary because optimizing
climate policy requires us to be able to quantify the benefits of abating emissions: the avoided
damages. Since there is a lack of theory and knowledge to tell us what the functional form
should be (Pindyck, 2013), modelers have resorted to imposing their own choice of functional
forms.
5Although not investigated here, there are models that incorporate damages directly on capital (Kopp
et al., 2012) or utility (Sterner and Persson, 2008; Barrage, 2016). Sterner and Persson (2008) explicitly
include non-market environmental services in the utility function with limited substitutability, which can
be degraded by warming. There is also empirical evidence that climate damages affect the growth rate of
output, not just the level (Dell et al., 2012), and this may have substantial policy impacts (Moore and Diaz,
2015).
6See Hsiang (2016) for references to several recent examples.
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Figure 1: A schematic of the DICE model with learning. The economy uses capital, labor
and technology to produce output. Emissions from factor production flow into the carbon
system. Additional atmospheric carbon dioxide increases temperature via radiative forcing.
Higher surface temperature increases damage to output. A learning policymaker uses her
observation of temperature and damages to refine her beliefs.
I.II Four Frameworks for Damage Uncertainty and The Dynamic
Programming DICE Model
In light of the damage function’s critiques, I develop four different frameworks for investigat-
ing the policy and welfare implications of damage uncertainty. The “uncertainty framework”
has the policymaker applying a distribution over d1 and treating it as subjectively uncertain.
The “learning framework” allows the policymaker to learn and refine her beliefs about d1
over time. The “robust framework” has the policymaker being uncertain about the value
of d1, and also applies robust control to capture concerns that the damage function in her
model is misspecified. Finally, the “robust control and learning (RC+L) framework” has the
policymaker combine updating her beliefs about d1 with the use of robust control.
I investigate damage uncertainty within a dynamic programming version of the bench-
mark DICE model. The dynamic programming model (and the original DICE model) is
finite-horizon Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth model coupled to a climate module with a
ten year timestep.7 The state space is composed of capital; the atmospheric, upper ocean,
7Other economists have developed versions of the DICE model with a reduced state space (Traeger, 2014),
or an annual timestep (Cai et al., 2015b). Lemoine and Rudik (2017) also use the same base model as this
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Figure 2: The timeline for each period. The policymaker begins by observing the state of the
world, then she updates her beliefs, and finally optimizes her policy for the current period.
and lower ocean CO2 stocks; surface and ocean temperatures; a state to capture stochastic
damages; and a state to capture a stochastically evolving parameter governing the policy-
maker’s beliefs about d1.
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Figure 1 displays a schematic of the model. The model begins in 2005 and ends in 2605
with a given terminal value function. Each period, the economy begins with an existing level
of capital, labor and technology. These are combined in a production function to generate
output. The resulting output can be used in three ways: investment to increase the future
stock of capital, abatement to reduce industrial CO2 emissions caused by factor production,
or consumption to increase flow utility. The policymaker’s objective is to maximize her
discounted expected stream of utility from consumption. When deciding on the optimal
way to divide output between abatement, consumption, and investment, the policymaker
uses her current beliefs about damages, which are given by her distribution over the damage
calibration d1.
Emissions directly enter the atmospheric stock of CO2 in the carbon system. CO2 flows
between the atmosphere and two other CO2 reservoirs: the upper ocean and biosphere, and
the lower ocean. Higher levels of atmospheric CO2 increase radiative forcing, a measure
of how much heat is trapped by greenhouse gases. Greater radiative forcing in turn raises
surface temperature in the climate system. As the Earth’s surface warms, it transfers thermal
energy to the ocean, which increases ocean temperature. Higher surface temperature causes
more damage, and reduces output. If the policymaker learns over time, she uses observations
of surface temperature and damages in a given period to update her beliefs about d1.
The timing of the model is shown in Figure 2. The period begins and then the policymaker
observes the state of the world. Damages are unknown prior to the beginning of the period
since there is subjective uncertainty over the damage calibration and objective stochasticity
paper.
8As will be shown later, the shape parameter of her belief distribution evolves exogenously over time so
it does not need to be kept as an explicit state.
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in the realization of damages. After the policymaker observes the current state, she uses
Bayes’ Law to update her distribution over the damage calibration. Next, with her new
beliefs, she selects levels of abatement, consumption, and investment that maximize her
expected welfare. Finally, the world transitions to the next period. The policymaker’s
problem can be represented by a Bellman equation,
Vt(St) = max
Ct,αt
{U(Ct, Lt) + β E [Vt+1(St+1)]} . (1)
subject to:
St+1 = f(St, Ct, αt)
where St is time t state vector, αt is abatement, Ct is consumption, Lt is labor, U(Ct, Lt)
is her flow utility function, Vt(St) is the policymaker’s time t value function, and f is the
set of state transition equations. Investment is determined by the residual output after con-
sumption and abatement. In each period, the policymaker maximizes the sum of her current
flow utility and her discounted expected continuation value where she takes expectations
using her time t beliefs. The appendix contains the more detailed, full representation of the
policymaker’s problem.
I.III The Damage Calibration and Learning
In all four frameworks, the policymaker assigns the damage calibration a lognormal prior
distribution, d1 ∼ logN (µt,Σt). In the frameworks with learning, the policymaker updates
this distribution each period.9 I use a lognormal prior for a combination of tractability
and to ensure the policymaker believes that higher temperatures lead to higher damages
as in the existing literature on damage uncertainty (Crost and Traeger, 2013, 2014). Her
immediate learning of the value of d1 is hindered by a sequence of independent and identically
distributed random shocks to damages, wt ∼ logN (µw, σ2w). These shocks capture random
variation in how warming affects factor production through, for example, random variation
in the frequency and magnitude of droughts or cyclones. The shock enters the damage
9The updating of solely d1 and not the functional form approximates the learning process of real world
integrated assessment modelers who have typically maintained the same damage function in updated versions
of their models, but refined the calibration at points in time. For example, in the 1999 Regional Integrated
Climate-Economy (RICE) model, low levels of warming increased output (Nordhaus, 2008), but in future
model vintages, the damage function was updated so positive warming strictly reduces output. All models
retained a quadratic functional form.
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function multiplicatively,
D(T st , wt) = d1 [T
s
t ]
2wt,
so that the damage function also has a lognormal distribution: D(T st , wt) ∼ logN ([T st ]2 + µt,Σt + σ2w).
Damages reduce the level of gross output as in the benchmark DICE model (Nordhaus, 2008),
Y nt =
Y gt
1 + d1 [T st ]
2wt
.
Rearranging the equation and taking the natural logarithm of both sides yields another
equation such that observed variables are on one side, and unobserved variables are on the
other,
log
(
Y gt
Y nt
− 1
)
− log ([T st ]2) = log(d1) + log(wt).
The policymaker observes the stochastically evolving level of output net of damages, Y nt ,
and she infers gross output before damages, Y gt , using the production function, the level of
technology, and the capital and labor stocks.10 This comprises all the variables on the left
hand side. On the other side of the equation, log(d1) and log(wt) are normally distributed
random variables that are not directly observed.
Relabel the expression on the left hand side Qt, where now Qt ∼ N (µt + µw,Σt + σ2w).
With each observation of the random variable Qt equal to some realized value qt at time t,
the learning policymaker updates the parameters of her prior according to Bayes’ Law,
µt =
Σt−1 (qt − µw) + σ2wµt−1
Σt−1 + σ2w
(2)
Σt =
Σt−1σ2w
Σt−1 + σ2w
. (3)
Σt, the shape parameter of the lognormal posterior for d1, declines monotonically and deter-
ministically over time.11 Since it is a function of only the previous period’s shape parameter
and the shape parameter of the shock distribution, there is no active learning channel in
this model.12 µt, the location parameter, is a weighted average of its previous value, and the
10This is an approximation to the real world learning process. In reality we may not know the global
production function nor stock of capital; however, researchers have been estimating damages over time in
different sectors using observations of temperature fluctuations and measures of production. See Hsiang
(2016) for examples of recent research.
11This is the variance parameter of the underlying normal distribution, and µt is the corresponding mean.
12There is only the possibility for active learning if the policymaker can amplify the signal relative to the
noise through her control variables. In unknown climate feedback settings, this is done through allowing
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Figure 3: The probability density function of the coefficient’s prior distribution in 2005
(left), and the probability density function for next period’s damages at 1◦C, 2◦C, and 3◦C
of warming given year 2005 beliefs (right).
realization of qt+1 − µω, a noisy signal of the underlying value of d1.
The policymaker’s expectation of d1 in the initial period is equal to the DICE calibration:
µ0 = 0.0028388. The subjective variance of d1 is set to 0.13
2 as in Nordhaus (2008). The
probability density function the coefficient d1 is shown in left panel of Figure 3.
13 The mean
of the lognormal shock is set to 1 so that the average shock has no effect on damages. I
calibrate the variance of the shock so that the variance of d1wt is double that of d1 alone,
which is the range of damage variances used in the previous literature (Nordhaus, 2008;
Crost and Traeger, 2013, 2014). The appendix contains a sensitivity analysis of the shock
variance. The right panel of Figure 3 displays the subjective distribution of damages at 1◦C,
2◦C, and 3◦C using the year 2005 prior over d1. The 1◦C distribution is highly peaked at
near-zero damages, and the right tail decays rapidly. The 2◦C and 3◦C distributions peak
at slightly higher damages, but are characterized by right tails that decay more slowly and
assign greater weight to higher damage outcomes.
additional emissions to accelerate warming (e.g., Kelly and Tan, 2015; Hwang et al., 2014) so the feedback
signal swamps the temperature noise. Here, the shock enters multiplicatively with the unknown damage
coefficient and thus, the noise and signal are equally amplified which provides no additional information. See
Karp and Traeger (2013) for additional information on when active learning is possible.
13The densities in both panels integrate to 1.
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I.IV Robust Control
Ideally, skepticism about damage functions should be built into an IAM by modeling a
policymaker who does not completely trust that the model is a precise representation of
reality. The policymaker instead would believe that her model is only an approximation to
the real world. In this case, the policymaker would recognize that the optimal policy she
obtains from her approximating model will almost surely not be optimal if taken and applied
in real world policy. So instead of striving to develop an optimal policy using a model that is
almost surely incorrect, the policymaker can instead try to find policy rules that are robust
to unknown, and in the short-term unlearnable, errors in her model.14
To capture concerns about damage function misspecifications, I model a policymaker
who uses robust control techniques in order to find policies that perform well even when
the damage function inside her IAM may be incorrect (Hansen and Sargent, 2007, 2008).
The policymaker begins with her approximating model, for example the standard quadratic
damage function, and then selects her policy by finding one that fares well over a set potential
models that are close in terms of the Kullback-Leibler divergence. The true model likely
resides in this set; however, because the models in this set are all relatively similar to her
own, they are difficult to statistically distinguish from one another over the time frame
of her policymaking. During policy optimization, alternative models more similar to her
approximating model are given greater weight, while those that are more different get less
weight. By taking this approach the policymaker is recognizing that her approximating
damage function is probably close to the true damage function, but not exactly right, and
she wishes to guard against unknown errors.15
Robust control induces robust decision rules by distorting state transition distributions
(Hansen and Sargent, 2008). The distortions reduce her perceived expected continuation
value and induce her to select policies that are designed for lower welfare worlds. Importantly,
in simulations the distortions only affect the policymaker’s decision rule, and not the actual
transition distributions.16 The policymaker maximizes her objective while accounting for
14Implicitly the four frameworks are taking different approaches to estimating an unknown data generating
process for damages. In the uncertainty framework a quadratic damage function is estimated once before
policymaking begins. The learning framework allows for periodic updates to the quadratic model, the robust
framework considers the possibility of other approximations to the damage function, and the framework
combining robust control and learning allows for the possibility of other damage functions with continual
re-estimation of the calibrated coefficient on the approximating damage function.
15This is in contrast to maxmin expected utility which maximizes welfare subject to the worst-case model
in some set (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989).
16Hansen and Sargent (2008) also demonstrate that the distortions can be represented as the optimal
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potential distortions, weighted by their Kullback-Leibler divergence. The distortions the
policymaker faces are implemented via state-dependent shocks to the transition distributions,
so that the distortions can be temporally linked and persist over time. This allows the
distortions to represent real misspecifications to the policymaker’s model. The distortions are
implemented in a non-linear dynamic programming framework by replacing the continuation
value in the policymaker’s Bellman equation with a risk sensitivity operator T 1 (Hansen and
Sargent, 2007),
T 1(β Vt+1(St+1)|θ1) = −θ1log
(
ESt+1
[
exp
(
−β Vt+1(St+1)
θ1
)])
,
where θ1 is a penalty parameter, described below, that calibrates how strongly the poli-
cymaker guards against these misspecifications, and the expectation operator is over next
period’s state, but not over d1. This results in a new Bellman equation,
Vt(St) = max
Ct,αt
{
U(Ct, Lt) + Ed1
[
T 1(β Vt+1(St+1)|θ1)
]}
. (4)
subject to:
St+1 = f(St, Ct, αt)
where the expectation acting outside the risk sensitivity operator is over d1.
For any θ1 ∈ (0,∞), the risk sensitivity operator distorts the density of continuation
values towards worse outcomes than if it was the usual expected continuation value. As θ1 →
∞, the risk sensitivity operator reduces to the usual subjective expected utility framework.17
There typically exists some point θ¯1, where the problem “breaks down” for θ1 < θ¯1. I
calibrate θ1 by selecting close to the breakdown point that would induce high levels of
concern for model misspecification stemming from the points outlined in Section I.I.18 For
selection of a transition probability measure by an evil agent whose objective is to minimize the payoff of
our policymaker. The evil agent’s selection is subject to a penalty proportional to the Kullback-Leibler
divergence of its distorted transition probability measure relative to the approximating model’s transition
probability measure.
17Consider a simple case where the continuation value, V rt+1, is distributed N(1, 1). The expected continu-
ation value is just 1. However, when we apply the risk sensitivity operator, the term inside the expectation is
now lognormally distributed and the expected continuation value becomes 1− 12 θ1 . Clearly, as θ1 →∞, we
are back in the subjective expected utility world. As θ1 decreases, the expected continuation value declines
and the policymaker acts as if she is facing worse futures. This induces her to select policies that better
guard against misspecifications which reduce her future welfare.
18Hansen and Sargent (2008) demonstrate how to calibrate θ1 using detection error probabilities in a linear
control setting when the distortion to the transitions can be solved for. Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas
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both frameworks the penalty parameter is set to θ1 = 200000. In Section III.II I show how
varying the concern for model misspecification alters policy.
II The Policy Effects of Uncertainty and Concern for
Model Misspecification
The time t optimal carbon tax is conventionally defined as the shadow value of time t
emissions relative to capital. Time t emissions affects time t + 1 atmospheric CO2, surface
temperature, and the fraction of output remaining after damages (Lt+1 = 11+d1 [T st ]2 wt ). From
here on I’ll call this fractional net output.19 To keep the equations as concise as possible
without losing intuition I focus only on the the temperature and fractional net output terms.
The omitted CO2 terms will be identical to the temperature terms but with temperature
replaced by CO2. The optimal carbon tax is then,
20
Taxt = E
[−∂Vt+1
∂T st+1
∂T st+1
∂et
+
−∂Vt+1
∂Lt+1
∂Lt+1
∂et
]/
E
[
∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
]
.
Without loss of generality, consider the optimal carbon tax for a policymaker utilizing robust
control. The optimal carbon tax expression is then,
Taxt =
E
[
exp
(
−β Vt+1
θ1
)(
−∂Vt+1
∂T st+1
∂T st+1
∂et
+ −∂Vt+1
∂Lt+1
∂Lt+1
∂et
)]
ESt+1
[
exp
(
−β Vt+1
θ1
)] /E [ ∂Vt+1
∂Kt+1
]
,
After taking the derivative of the risk sensitivity operator, the expectation is over both
d1 and St+1 in the numerator. The application of robust control introduces a new term,
exp
(
−β Vt+1
θ1
)
, which when normalized by its expectation, corresponds to the worst-case
distortion to the perceived transition density induced by the risk sensitivity operator (Hansen
and Sargent, 2007).
(2012) formally derive a closed form solution for the worst case misspecification exploiting a linear-quadratic
model. The DICE model is highly non-linear and does not admit closed form solutions for these approaches
to penalty parameter calibration.
19I use fractional net output as a state instead of damages to obtain a bounded domain, Lt+1 ∈ [0, 1].
20Emissions at time t only enter the atmosphere after one period in DICE. The capital shadow value can
be thought of as coming from the policymaker’s first-order condition for consumption where she trades off
current utility against future capital. Hence, this is equivalent to normalizing by the marginal utility of
consumption in time t, modulo a discount factor.
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After dropping value function partial derivative with respect to capital for clarity, the
equation can be rearranged to recover the conventional carbon tax expression (first line) and
an additively separable adjustment for robust control (second line),
Taxt ∝ E
[−∂Vt+1
∂T st+1
]
∂T st+1
∂et
+ E
[−∂Vt+1
∂Lt+1
]
E
[
∂Lt+1
∂et
]
+ cov
(−∂Vt+1
∂Lt+1 ,
∂Lt+1
∂et
)
+ cov
−∂Vt+1
∂St+1
∂St+1
∂et
,
exp
(
−βVt+1
θ1
)
ESt+1
[
exp
(
−βVt+1
θ1
)]
 .
And finally, a second-order Taylor expansion of the value function partial derivative terms
on the first line around the expected time t + 1 state vector ζ := E[St+1] results in the
following expression, which I will group into six different channels,21
Taxt ∝ −∂Vt+1
∂T st+1
∣∣∣∣
ce
∂T st+1
∂et
+
−∂Vt+1
∂Lt+1
∣∣∣∣
ce
∂Lt+1
∂et
∣∣∣∣
ce
(5)
+
(
−∂Vt+1
∂T st+1
∣∣∣∣
ζ
− −∂Vt+1
∂T st+1
∣∣∣∣
ce
)
∂T st+1
∂et
+
(
−∂Vt+1
∂Lt+1
∣∣∣∣
ζ
E
[
∂Lt+1
∂et
]
− −∂Vt+1
∂Lt+1
∣∣∣∣
ce
∂Lt+1
∂et
∣∣∣∣
ce
)
+
1
2
−∂3Vt+1
∂T st+1L2t+1
∂T st+1
∂et
var(Lt+1) + 1
2
−∂3Vt+1
∂L3t+1
E
[
∂Lt+1
∂et
]
var(Lt+1)
+
−∂3Vt+1
∂T st+1∂Lt+1∂µt+1
∂T st+1
∂et
cov(Lt+1, µt+1) + −∂
3Vt+1
∂L2t+1∂µt+1
E
[
∂Lt+1
∂et
]
cov(Lt+1, µt+1)
+
1
2
−∂3Vt+1
∂T st+1∂µ
2
t+1
∂T st+1
∂et
var(µt+1) +
1
2
−∂3Vt+1
∂Lt+1∂µ2t+1
E
[
∂ Lt+1
∂et
]
var(µt+1)
+ cov
(−∂Vt+1
∂Lt+1 ,
∂Lt+1
∂et
)
+ cov
−∂Vt+1
∂St+1
∂St+1
∂et
,
exp
(
−βVt+1
θ1
)
ESt+1
[
exp
(
−βVt+1
θ1
)]
 ,
where |ce indicates certainty: the term is evaluated as if the policymaker is in a deterministic
world with d1 equal to the mean of her time t beliefs. For the subsequent analysis of channels,
note that fractional net output is decreasing in emissions (∂Lt+1/∂et < 0) and temperature
is increasing in emissions (∂Tt+1/∂et > 0).
The first channel is the certainty tax which is composed of the terms on the first line
on the right hand side of equation (5). This is the tax the policymaker would set in a
deterministic, perfect-information world if she happened to be at her current state at time t
21Lemoine and Rudik (2017) similarly demonstrate how to use Taylor expansions of the value function to
gain insight into how uncertainty over the climate’s sensitivity to emissions drives optimal policy.
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and the damage calibration matched her expectation.
The second channel is the uncertainty adjustment, which is composed of terms on the
second line. This channel alters the certainty tax so that it correctly accounts for uncertainty
in the marginal effect of emissions on time t+1 expected welfare due to subjective uncertainty
over the damage calibration’s value and objective uncertainty over the damage shock in time
t+ 1.
The third channel is the precautionary abatement motive, which is composed of terms
on the third and fourth lines. The third derivative of utility corresponds to how uncertainty
about future consumption affects the agent’s contemporaneous saving decision (Leland, 1968;
Dreze and Modigliani, 1972; Kimball, 1990). If uncertainty about future consumption in-
creases contemporaneous savings, the agent is said to exhibit prudence. In a climate-economy
setting, abatement is a form of environmental savings: increasing current abatement means
that the policymaker forgoes a sure consumption payoff now for increased consumption later
due to lower future damages. The last term on the third line captures this most clearly. If
the third derivative of her continuation value with respect to fractional net output is positive,
then,
1
2
−∂3Vt+1
∂L3t+1
E
[
∂Lt+1
∂et
]
var(Lt+1) > 0,
and the policymaker increases her abatement. The precautionary motive also scales in size
with the amount of subjective variability in future output. The previous two terms on the
third line capture similar precautionary abatement motives in the face of uncertain output. If
these terms increase abatement then the agent would be called cross-prudent (Gollier, 2010).
The policymaker is cross-prudent if she would prefer to have a mean-zero risk attached to
fractional net output when CO2 or temperature are lower rather than when they are higher.
The fourth line also capture precautionary abatement motives because of cross-prudence,
but here, instead of increasing abatement because of future variability in fractional net
output, the policymaker abates because of co-variability between fractional net output and
her beliefs about the damage calibration. This covariance is likely negative since lower than
expected future output is the signal that the policymaker would need to receive to revise her
future beliefs upward. This covariance matters because when future beliefs about damages
are uncertain, then future output and future consumption appear to be even more variable.
Whatever information the policymaker receives about output in the future feeds back onto
her future payoffs through her expectations. If this covariance is negative, it tends to increase
precautionary abatement.
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The fourth channel is the signal smoothing motive, which is composed of the terms on
the fifth line. This channel captures effects of learning on the optimal tax. The second
derivative of the value function with respect to the location parameter, −∂2Vt+1/∂µ2t+1,
captures how well the policymaker can use new information to smooth welfare over possible
values of d1. Since a higher location parameter for the policymaker’s beliefs strictly increases
her expectation about d1, and if −∂2Vt+1/∂µ2t+1 > 0 as we may expect, then the marginal
welfare cost of a higher damage calibration belief is increasing and convex. If there is not
much curvature in her beliefs and ∂2Vt+1/∂µ
2
t+1 is small, then she is able to smooth welfare
effectively, but the larger ∂2Vt+1/∂µ
2
t+1 is in magnitude, the less she can smooth welfare, and
the more costly a bad signal of d1 becomes.
The triple derivatives then indicate how a marginal increase in CO2, temperature or out-
put net of damages affects the policymaker’s ability to smooth welfare in response to new
information. Indeed, we may expect additional CO2 or temperature decrease her ability
to smooth welfare (−∂3Vt+1/∂Matmt+1 ∂µ2t+1 > 0,−∂3Vt+1/∂T st+1∂µ2t+1 > 0), and that hav-
ing a greater fraction of her gross output would increase her ability to smooth welfare
(−∂3Vt+1/∂Lt+1∂µ2t+1 < 0). Additional temperature or CO2 results in greater damage and
less output to be able to use towards capital investment or abatement, while additional out-
put has the opposite effect. In these cases, additional variability in future beliefs magnifies
this effect and increases the optimal tax.
The fifth channel is the output insurance channel, which is captured by the first term
on the last line. Output insurance reduces the optimal level of emissions if and only if the
covariance is positive. The second term in the covariance captures the marginal reduction in
fractional net output from emissions. The first term in the covariance captures the marginal
welfare cost of less fractional net output. Similar to consumption-based asset pricing models,
the policymaker cares about the covariance of returns with marginal welfare. If emissions
reductions are most effective in preserving output when output is most valuable to welfare,
then this channel reduces the optimal level of emissions. Intuitively, this seems like the most
plausible case since emissions reduce output most greatly when d1 is large, and large d1
implies lower output and higher marginal welfare.
The final channel is the misspecification insurance channel, which is captured by the final
term. The misspecification insurance channel reduces emissions if and only if the covariance
is positive. The magnitude and direction of the misspecification insurance channel depends
on how the marginal welfare cost of emissions covaries with the distortion to the transition
density. If a larger distortion makes the marginal welfare cost of emissions appear larger as
15
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Figure 4: The mean optimal carbon tax over 5000 simulations for each framework when the
true damage function is quadratic.
intuition suggests, then misspecification insurance tends to reduce emissions.
III Results
First, I display the mean optimal carbon tax trajectories and the corresponding climate
outcomes for each of the four frameworks. Next, I vary the robust control penalty parameter
to examine how the policymaker’s concern for model misspecification affects policy. Then
I decompose the carbon taxes into each channel outlined in Section II to determine how
uncertainty matters for policy. Finally, I analyze ex-post welfare outcomes under the different
frameworks when the policymaker may have misspecified the damage function in her model.
In each simulation run I sample d1 from its year 2005 prior distribution and I also sample a
vector of annual shocks from the distribution of the stochastic damage shock ωt.
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Table 1: The average carbon tax in 2015 and 2105, peak CO2 and temperature, and the 5
th
and 95th percentiles (in parentheses) for each framework.
Framework
Uncertainty Learning Robust RC+L
2105 Tax ($/tCO2)
50 48 53 48
(48,52) (27,77) (51,55) (27,77)
2205 Tax ($/tCO2)
184 175 189 175
(166,196) (97,276) (170,201) (96,275)
Peak CO2 (ppm)
704 735 691 735
(700,709) (609,887) (687,696) (609,886)
Peak Temperature (◦C)
3.67 3.79 3.60 3.79
(3.65,3.71) (3.10,4.44) (3.58,3.64) (3.10,4.44)
III.I Optimal Carbon Tax Trajectories
Figure 4 displays the first century’s mean optimal carbon tax trajectories in $/tCO2 when
the policymaker has correctly specified the damage functional form as quadratic.22 In the
uncertainty framework, the policymaker begins her optimal tax in 2005 at $7.77/tCO2 and
ramps it up to $50.40/tCO2 in 2105. When the policymaker is able to learn the damage
calibration over time, she sets a lower initial carbon tax of $7.50/tCO2, which rises to
$48.21/tCO2 at the end of the century. Applying robust control to guard against potential
model misspecification tends to increase the tax when not updating beliefs about d1. In
2005 the robust control tax begins at $8.57/tCO2, 10 percent higher than the uncertainty
framework. Over the first century, the robust control tax increases faster than the uncertainty
tax in absolute terms and reaches $53.48/tCO2 at the end of the century. Applying robust
control on top of learning has negligible effects on the optimal carbon tax.
Table 1 displays the mean, 5th and 95th percentile outcomes for the 2105 carbon tax,
the 2205 carbon tax, and for peak CO2 and warming since year 1900. Learning results in
significant variability in realized carbon taxes since the policymaker adapts her policy to
the noisy information she receives about each simulation’s specific d1. After 100 years the
learning carbon tax is on average only $2/tCO2 less than the uncertainty tax, but in some
cases it may be nearly 50 percent lower or 50 percent higher. This also holds true after 200
years. After 100 years the mean robust control carbon tax is 6 percent higher than the mean
22Some papers report carbon taxes in terms of dollars per ton of carbon. The unit conversion is 11 tons
of CO2 to three tons of carbon.
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uncertainty carbon tax, but after 200 years the relative difference declines to 3%.
When learning, the policymaker peaks CO2 4 percent higher on average, which results in
a 3 percent higher peak warming compared to the uncertainty framework. Conversely, the
more aggressive carbon tax in the robust control framework tends to peak CO2 and warming
lower than the uncertainty framework, both by 2 percent. There is also significant variability
in climatic outcomes when learning. The 90 percent confidence interval for peak CO2 is 278
ppm wide, more than half of the approximately 400 ppm CO2 concentration today in the real
world. The 90 percent confidence interval in peak warming is 0.34◦C, which is approximately
how much the Earth warmed between 1980 and 2000.
III.II The Effect of Concern for Model Misspecification
Figure 5 displays how changing the level of the policymaker’s concern about model mis-
specification affects the initial optimal carbon tax. Smaller values of the penalty parameter
indicate greater concern. The left panel of Figure 5 displays the optimal carbon tax as a
function of the penalty parameter for the uncertainty framework. When the penalty param-
eter is sufficiently large, the year 2005 optimal carbon tax is effectively equal to the optimal
carbon tax when not applying robust control. As the penalty parameter declines and we
move to the left on the plot, the optimal carbon tax increases, and on this plot, peaks at
$8.58/tCO2 when the penalty parameter is 200000. Decreasing it further illustrates how
the problem begins to breakdown. There is a sharp decrease in the optimal carbon tax at
a penalty parameter around 110000, and then for values that are only slightly smaller, the
model fails to solve.23
The right panel of Figure 5 displays the initial optimal carbon tax for the robust control
and learning framework. Again, a sufficiently large penalty parameter leads the optimal car-
bon tax to be effectively equal to the learning framework without robust control. Decreasing
the penalty parameter leads to a slight increase in the carbon tax before beginning a quicker
decline once the penalty parameter goes below 200000. The effect of varying the concern for
model misspecification is substantially smaller than without learning. The optimal carbon
tax reaches a low point at a penalty parameter around 130000; however, the initial carbon
tax never varies by more than $0.01/tCO2. Decreasing the penalty parameter to slightly
below 130000 leads to a sharp increase in the optimal tax to $8.49/tCO2 (off the plot) and
23Since the policymaker has an iso-elastic utility function with an elasticity of intertemporal substitution
that is less than 1, her utility is negative and unbounded below. The problem breaks down when her
continuation value is numerically equivalent to negative infinity.
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Figure 5: The year 2005 optimal carbon taxes when using robust control in the uncertainty
framework (left) and the learning framework (right). Note that each panel has a different
y-axis scale and the x-axis is on a log10 scale.
then a complete breakdown of the problem.24
III.III Decomposing the Optimal Carbon Tax
Figure 6 plots the five channels that capture uncertainty’s effect on the optimal carbon taxes
plotted in Figure 4. Note that all panels have different scales to better display differences
between the different frameworks. Panel (a) plots the uncertainty adjustment, the strongest
of the channels. For all but the robust control framework, the uncertainty adjustment is neg-
ative and grows in magnitude over time. This negative adjustment is driven by the convexity
of output in damages. As the Earth’s surface warms, it increases damage variability since
surface temperature enters damages multiplicatively with the uncertain damage calibration
and the stochastic damage shock. Because output is convex in damages, increased variability
yields higher expected output and greater welfare. The policymaker’s optimal adjustment
is then to reduce the carbon tax. For the uncertainty framework, the adjustment begins at
nearly zero, but monotonically increases in size to -$2/tCO2 in 2205 as temperature increases
24Selecting an alternative penalty parameter than the one used here for the learning framework has virtually
no impact on the results.
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Figure 6: The five carbon tax channels. Note that each panel has a different y-axis scale.20
and damages appear subjectively more variable to the policymaker.
In the two frameworks with learning the uncertainty adjustment is more strongly negative
since increases in damage variability are magnified by the policymaker’s anticipated variabil-
ity in future beliefs. In the frameworks with learning, the uncertainty adjustment increases
in size from approximately -$0.60/tCO2 to nearly -$10.00/tCO2 between 2005–2205.
The robust control framework is the only one with a positive uncertainty adjustment. The
risk sensitivity operator, T 1 distorts the continuation value in a way that makes uncertainty
over the damage calibration appear to result in lower expected future welfare, which induces
an increase in the carbon tax. This effect increases over time from $0.80/tCO2 in 2005 to
$2.90/tCO2 in 2145 before beginning to decline.
Panel (b) displays the effect of output insurance. As hypothesized, this channel increases
the optimal carbon tax. This channel is near zero at first since surface temperature is
low and there is not much variability in the marginal effect of emissions on fractional net
output. After two centuries, the size of the channel grows to approximately $0.60/tCO2
when not learning. The two learning frameworks see a smaller amount of output insurance
which peaks at only $0.25/tCO2. Learning resolves subjective variability in the effect of
emissions on fractional net output, which offsets the increased variability caused by higher
temperature.
Panel (c) plots the precautionary abatement motive, which is small over the entire time
horizon. Initially precautionary abatement is effectively zero since variability in damages
is negligible early on. Early precautionary abatement is higher when learning since the
cross-prudent policymaker is additionally concerned about how variability in future dam-
ages covaries with uncertain future beliefs. Additional warming over time increases damage
variability, leading to greater precautionary abatement for all frameworks. In the learning
frameworks, this is again partially offset by the policymaker resolving her subjective uncer-
tainty over the damage calibration. In all cases, the size of the precautionary abatement
motive is small and contributes at most a few cents to the optimal carbon tax.
Panel (d) plots the signal smoothing channel, which is specific to the frameworks with
learning. This channel increases the optimal carbon tax because emissions hinder the poli-
cymaker’s ability to smooth welfare. The signal smoothing channel peaks at $0.13/tCO2 in
2005 and declines over time as she resolves uncertainty over d1 and her future beliefs become
less variable. With each update of her beliefs, more weight is placed on her prior and new
information becomes less valuable. In turn, emissions become less costly.
Panel (e) plots the misspecification insurance channel. The channel always increases
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the carbon tax, indicating that the distortion to her transition density makes emissions
reductions appear especially valuable. This channel begins small but grows over time for both
robust control frameworks. The marginal benefit of emissions reductions and the distortion
to the transition density become more variable, which increases their covariance and the
desire to insure against misspecification. The misspecification insurance channel grows slower
when learning since resolving uncertainty over d1 reduces variability in both terms in the
covariance. This results in misspecification insurance only half as large in 2205 as when not
learning.
III.IV Ex-Post Welfare when the Damage Function is Misspecified
I next investigate the relative welfare performance of the frameworks when facing true dam-
age functions that may be different than the one in the policymaker’s model. I assume the
policymaker has correctly specified the damage function as within the class of polynomials,
and that her distribution on the coefficient of d1 is also correct. However, I allow the degree
of the polynomial to be misspecified so the function is either less convex with an exponent
of 1.75, or more convex with an exponent of 2.25 or 2.5.
Since I am exploring outcomes when models are misspecified, I must simulate the model
and calculate the welfare outcomes over a finite horizon. The frameworks’ value functions
only yield the true ex-ante expected welfare when the model is specified correctly. This
welfare analysis is also ex-post. Although an ex-ante analysis is intrinsically attractive, it
requires assuming that economists and scientists have a well-grounded distribution for the
degree of the damage function. I do not take a stand on what the distribution over the
damage exponent should be and instead I calculate welfare for specific values for the degree
of the damage function. An ex-ante analysis can be easily approximated by weighting the
welfare outcomes for each of the damage functions examined here.
Figure 7 displays the balanced growth equivalent (BGE) gain in consumption for each
of the frameworks relative to the uncertainty framework (Mirrlees and Stern, 1972; Jensen
and Traeger, 2013; Lemoine and Traeger, 2014). The BGE is the per-capita consumption
level which, when growing at some constant rate, would yield the same level of welfare as
the the optimal policy of a given framework. The horizontal axis on each plot denotes four
different horizons over which welfare is evaluated. Each plot is for a different exponent. The
uncertainty framework is omitted since it is the baseline framework. An equivalent level of
welfare as the uncertainty framework is denoted by the dashed line. Plots above the dashed
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Figure 7: The balanced growth equivalent consumption gain of the learning (Learn, circle),
robust control (RC, triangle), and robust control and learning (RC+L, square) frameworks
relative to the uncertainty framework over four different time horizons and four different
damage functional forms.
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line indicate gains relative to the uncertainty framework and plots below the dashed line
indicate losses.
If the true damage function exponent is 1.75 then the true damage function is less convex
than the policymaker believes and damages will not rise as rapidly in the future. The
robust control framework does worse than the uncertainty framework, incurring BGE losses
of between 0.017 percent and 0.005 percent depending on the time horizon. The robust
control framework guards against bad misspecifications by distorting future states to appear
worse than the model indicates, but here, future states are actually better. Conversely, the
frameworks with learning generally result in BGE gains. When learning, the BGE gain grows
larger as the horizon is extended and peaks at 0.007 percent when considering a time horizon
of 200 years. Although the policymaker has misspecified the damage function, learning does
allow her to push expectations of future damages in the correct direction by attributing lower
damage realizations to a lower damage calibration instead of a low damage exponent.
When the true damage function exponent is 2.0 and the model is correctly specified,
the learning frameworks again do best with BGE gains of 0.001–0.008 percent. The robust
control framework is incorrectly concerned for model misspecification, leading to a carbon
tax that is too high and consumption that is too low. Robust control consequently incurs
BGE losses over all the time horizons, but potentially up to 0.015 percent in the short term
as the policymaker substitutes away from early consumption towards emissions abatement.
If the true damage function exponent is greater than 2.0, then the policymaker’s model
underestimates the convexity of the damage function and how rapidly damages will increase
as the Earth warms. When the exponent is 2.25, the learning frameworks again do best,
with the robust control and learning framework performing slightly better than just learning
alone. BGE gains under the learning frameworks reach up to 0.015 percent when the damage
function exponent is 2.5. Without learning, robust control performs the worst in the short
term when facing a more convex damage function. The benefits of increased abatement
under robust control realize in the future and are spread out over many decades, so the
policymaker needs a long time horizon to reap the benefits of forgone early consumption.
IV Conclusions
Most economists believe that the damage functions in IAMs are misspecified. Yet analyses of
optimal climate policy have not investigated the effects of updating the damage function over
time, or for adapting policy to take account of the widely noted concerns of damage function
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misspecification. I fill this gap in the literature by comparing the performance of four pol-
icy frameworks with different degrees of damage assumptions. The uncertainty framework
accounts for uncertainty in the calibration of the damage function while assuming a known
functional form. The learning framework acknowledges that economists do learn over time
and allows the policymaker to update her distribution over the uncertain damage function
calibration within the model, assuming the same functional form. The robust framework bor-
rows techniques from the macroeconomic literature to incorporate concerns that the damage
function is misspecified in unknown ways. The robust policymaker constructs policies that
guard against model misspecification. Last, the robust control and learning framework com-
bines concern for model misspecification with updating of beliefs over the damage coefficient.
For each of the frameworks, I analytically demonstrate how misspecification concerns, and
uncertainty in damages and future beliefs feed into the optimal carbon tax.
I find that uncertainty over the damage calibration generally lowers the optimal carbon
tax through the uncertainty adjustment. An analytical decomposition reveals that there are
conflicting effects of uncertainty on the optimal carbon tax due to precautionary abatement,
insurance against co-variability of the marginal cost of emissions and welfare, and variability
in future beliefs. Concern for robustness tends increase the carbon tax through a channel
that parallel insurance motives in the savings literature. If the damage function is misspec-
ified as widely believed, robust control and (incorrect) learning can achieve higher welfare
than accounting for parametric damage uncertainty alone. However, the welfare gains from
utilizing robust control alone may not realize until decades or centuries into the future, rais-
ing potential concerns about inter-generational equity in bearing the costs and benefits of
designing a more robust climate policy.
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Online Appendix
The online appendix gives full details on the dynamic stochastic version of the DICE model,
provides additional details on Robust Control, and finally, shows the results of accuracy and
sensitivity checks.
A The Full Stochastic DICE Model
The DICE model is a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth model coupled to a climate system.
The model is governed by a representative policymaker whose objective is to maximize her
expected discounted welfare. Each period in DICE lasts one decade and the model begins
in 2005.
In each period t, the policymaker has an endowment of capital Kt, labor Lt, and tech-
nology At. These are combined in a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce gross
output,
Y gt = At L
1−κ
t K
κ
t .
Warming of the Earth’s surface causes damage to output, resulting in net output after
damages,
Y nt = Y
g
t Lt,
where Lt is the fraction of output remaining after damages,
Lt = 1
1 + d1 [T st ]
d2 wt
.
The policymaker has three ways to use her net output each period. First, she can use it for
consumption Ct to increase utility,
U(Ct, Lt) = Lt
(Ct/Lt)
1−η
(1− η) , η 6= 1.
Second, she can use it to abate some fraction of emissions from factor production, αt. The
residual is left for investment into increasing the future capital stock, which depreciates at
I
an annual rate of δk. Net emissions after abatement is given by,
et = 10 [σt(1− αt)Y gt +Bt] .
Bt is emissions from exogenous land use change, and σt is the emissions intensity of output.
Emissions enter the atmospheric stock of CO2, M
atm
t . CO2 can then flow to the upper ocean
CO2 stock M
up
t , and the lower ocean CO2 stock M
lo
t . Increased atmospheric CO2 increases
the level of radiative forcing,
Ft(M
atm
t ) = f2x log2(M
atm
t /Mpre) + EFt,
where EFt is exogenous forcing from non-CO2 long-lived greenhouse gases and f2x is the
additional forcing from a doubling of atmospheric CO2. Radiative forcing increases the
temperature of the Earth’s surface, T st . Thermal energy from the surface can move into the
lower ocean, T ot and also back from the ocean to the surface depending on which is warmer.
The parameter C1 governs the rate of warming at the Earths surface from additional forcing
or a warmer ocean, C3 governs how quickly the surface loses thermal energy to the ocean,
and C4 governs how quickly the lower ocean loses thermal energy to the surface.
Finally, each period the policymaker observes the level of surface temperature, capital,
labor, technology and resulting net output. Using this information she updates her beliefs
over d1 as described in the main text.
The model’s exogenous economic processes are,
Lt = L0 + (L∞ − L0) gL,t (Labor population)
gL,t = [exp(δL t)− 1] /exp (δL t) (Labor population growth rate)
At = At−1/(1− gA,t) (Production technology)
gA,t = 10 gA,0 exp(−δA t) (Production technology growth rate)
Period t = 0 indicates the year 2005, and each period is ten years. The exogenous climate
processes are,
σt = σt−1/(1− gσ,t) (Gross emissions per unit of output)
gσ,t = gσ,0 exp(−δσ t) (Growth rate of gross emissions per unit of output)
ψt =
a0 σt
a1a2
(a1 − 1 + exp(−gΨ t)) (Abatement cost coefficient)
II
Bt = B0 g
t
B (Non-industrial CO2 emissions)
EFt = EF0 + 0.1 (EF1 − EF0) min(t, 10) (Exogenous forcing)
Table 1 reports the values of the model parameters. The calibration of the distribution over
d1 and the damage shock are described in the main text.
Table 1: The parameters of the model.
Parameter Value Description
A0 0.027 Initial production technology
gA,0 0.009 Initial growth rate of production technology
δA 0.001 Change in growth rate of production technology
L0 6514 Year 2005 population (millions)
L∞ 8600 Asymptotic population (millions)
δL 0.35 Rate of approach to asymptotic population level
σ0 0.13 Initial emission intensity of output (Gigatons of carbon per unit output)
gσ,0 -0.073 Initial growth rate of decarbonization
δσ 0.003 Change in growth rate of emissions intensity
a0 1.17 Cost of backstop technology in 2005 ($1000 per ton of carbon)
a1 2 Ratio of initial backstop technology cost to final backstop technology cost
a2 2.8 Abatement cost function exponent
gΨ 0.05 Growth rate of backstop technology cost
B0 1.1 Initial non-industrial CO2 emissions (Gigatons of carbon)
gB 0.9 Growth rate of non-industrial emissions
d2 2 Damage exponent
EF0 -0.06 Year 2005 exogenous forcing (W/m
2)
EF100 0.30 Year 2105 exogenous forcing (W/m
2)
κ 0.3 Capital elasticity in production
δκ 0.1 Annual capital depreciation rate
Mpre 596.4 Pre-industrial atmospheric CO2 (Gigatons of carbon)
β 1/1.01510 Discount factor
η 2 1/EIS, and RRA
φ11 0.811 Carbon transfer coefficient for atmosphere to atmosphere
φ12 0.189 Carbon transfer coefficient for atmosphere to upper ocean
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Parameter Value Description
φ21 0.097 Carbon transfer coefficient for upper ocean to atmosphere
φ22 0.853 Carbon transfer coefficient for upper ocean to upper ocean
φ23 0.050 Carbon transfer coefficient for upper ocean to lower ocean
φ32 0.003 Carbon transfer coefficient for lower ocean to upper ocean
φ33 0.997 Carbon transfer coefficient for lower ocean to lower ocean
C1 0.22 Warming delay parameter
C3 0.3 Parameter governing transfer of heat from ocean to surface
C4 0.05 Parameter governing transfer of heat from surface to ocean
f2x 3.8 Forcing from doubling of CO2 (W/m
2)
s 3 Climate sensitivity
K0 137 Year 2005 capital (trillions of USD)
Matm0 808.9 Year 2005 atmospheric CO2 (Gigatons of carbon)
Mup0 1255 Year 2005 biosphere and upper ocean CO2 (Gigatons of carbon)
M lo0 18365 Year 2005 lower ocean CO2 (Gigatons of carbon)
T atm0 0.7307 Year 2005 atmospheric temperature (Degrees Celsius)
T ocean0 0.0068 Year 2005 ocean temperature (Degrees Celsius)
µ0 -5.9596 Year 2005 d1 location parameter
Σ0 0.1904 Year 2005 d1 shape parameter
µw -.0799 Damage shock location parameter
σw 0.1599 Damage shock shape parameter
To improve computational efficiency I make two changes of variables that do not affect
the model itself but only how it is coded. I let capital and consumption be in effective
technology and labor terms,
kt =
Kt
A
1/(1−κ)
t Lt
,
ct =
Ct
A
1/(1−κ)
t Lt
.
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Utility is maintained in non-effective terms so the new utility function is,
u(ct;At, Lt) = A
(1−η)/(1−κ)
t Lt
c1−ηt
1− η .
The policymaker’s problem is then,1
Vt(kt, T
s
t , T
o
t ,M
atm
t ,M
up
t ,M
lo
t ,Lt, µt,Σt) =
max
ct,αt
{
u(ct;At, Lt) + β E
[
Vt+1(kt+1, T
s
t+1, T
o
t+1,M
atm
t+1 ,M
up
t+1,M
lo
t+1,Lt+1, µt+1,Σt+1)
]}
subject to transitions:
kt+1 =
1
A
1/(1−κ)
t+1 Lt+1
[
(1− δk)10A1/(1−κ)t Lt kt + 10
(
(1− ψtαa2t )Y nt − A1/(1−κ)t Lt ct
)]
,M
atm
t+1
Mupt+1
M lot+1
 =
φ11 φ21 0φ12 φ22 φ32
0 φ23 φ33

M
atm
t
Mupt
M lot
+
et0
0
 ,
T st+1 = T
s
t + C1
[
Ft+1(M
atm
t+1 )−
f2x
s
T st + C3 (T
o
t − T st )
]
,
T ot+1 = C4 T
s
t + (1− C4)T ot ,
Lt+1 = 1
1 + d1
[
T st+1
]d2 wt+1 ,
µt+1 =
Σt
(
log
(
Y gt
Y nt
− 1
)
− log ([T st ]2)− µω
)
+ σ2w µt
Σt + σ2w
,
Σt+1 =
Σtσ
2
w
Σt + σ2w
.
Finally I constrain abatement to be less than 100 percent and I impose the resource con-
straint,
αt ≤ 1,
A
1/(1−κ)
t Lt ct + (ψtα
a2
t )Y
n
t ≤ Y nt .
If the policymaker does not learn, then µt+1 = µt and Σt+1 = Σt.
1Σt does not technically enter the state space for collocation but I display it here for clarity.
V
A.1 Model Solution Method
The model is solved using value function iteration on a finite horizon. The collocation grid
and polynomial interpolant are built using the Smolyak sparse grid method (Smolyak, 1963;
Judd et al., 2014). The Smolyak method is optimal in the sense that, for a given number
of grid points, it yields the collocation grid and set of basis functions that minimize the L2
and L∞ norms of the approximation error for the class of functions with bounded second-
order mixed derivatives (Brumm and Scheidegger, 2015). Here I use an approximation
level of µ = 3 for the Smolyak algorithm which implies nine unique collocation points on
each dimension, although the full tensor product is not used to construct the collocation
grid. The terminal year is 2605. The terminal continuation value function corresponding
to 2615 has the policymaker not learning while holding her initial 2005 beliefs, and has all
exogenous processes held constant at their 2615 levels. Changing the terminal value function
to one where the policymaker does not expect damage stochasticity and believes the damage
function to be exactly equal to that in the conventional DICE model does not significantly
alter the results. The relative errors between the optimal trajectories are generally on the
order of 10−4 or smaller, but peak near 10−3 after 200 years as the policymaker gets closer
to the terminal value function.
Expectations over future states are taken using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with seven
quadrature points for both the prior and the damage shock for a total of 49 quadrature
points. Increasing the number of quadrature points has virtually zero effect on the results.
Also note that the support of the location parameter for a lognormal distribution is the
entire real line. So, depending on the draw of d1 and the sequence of shocks, it can take on
any value in (−∞,∞). I select a domain where in practice, virtually all of the simulation
runs stay within the domain. Expanding the size of the domain used in the main text by 50
percent leads to a change in the optimal carbon tax of the learning framework of only 5×10−3
on average. Alternatively, using the learning domain for µt, or one that is 90 percent smaller,
only results in a relative difference of 4×10−6 for the uncertainty framework’s optimal carbon
tax. Without truncating the distribution, I cannot guarantee that the location parameter
will always stay within the domain. If it does jump outside the collocation domain during
one of the simulation runs I throw out the run and perform a replacement run, however this
is a rare occurrence.
VI
B Robust Control
The policymaker faces objective randomness in how damages realize over time, but she
also faces subjective uncertainty due to her limited knowledge of how temperature actually
manifests as damages. Her attitudes towards the first, objective source of uncertainty, may
be different than her attitudes towards the second, subjective source of uncertainty, which is
generally called ambiguity. The disconnect in these two forms of uncertainty is introduced
into the axiomatization of preferences as a weakening of the Axiom of Independence.
Robust control puts ambiguity into context as a concern about model misspecification.
The ways her model is misspecified are unknown and unlikely to be learned in a reasonable
time frame, so she is unable to apply probability distributions over possible true models and
stay in the usual subjective expected utility setting. For example, assuming the damage func-
tion is truly a polynomial, she may not know the exact degree of polynomial. To capture
attitudes towards ambiguity stemming from model misspecification, robust control intro-
duces a new set of preferences for the policymaker: multiplier preferences (Strzalecki, 2011).
Multiplier preferences are a special case of variational preferences (Maccheroni et al., 2006)
where a penalty parameter θ1 determines the policymaker’s attitude towards ambiguity and
also gauges how robustly she designs policy to potential misspecifications in her model. Mul-
tiplier preferences are characterized by a relative entropy function, alternatively called the
Kullback-Leibler divergence, which measures the statistical distance between distributions.2
The relative entropy function,
Dt+1(pt+1||qt+1) =
∫
log
(
dpt+1
dqt+1
)
dpt+1,
enters the policymaker’s Bellman equation as a minimization problem:
Vt(St) = min
qt+1
{
max
ct,αt
[∫
u(ct;At, Lt) dqt+1 + θ1Dt+1(pt+1||qt+1) + βVt+1(St+1)
]}
Where pt+1 is her approximating model of the transition probabilities, and qt+1 is a distorted
model of transition probabilities, where the size of the distortion is selected by an “evil agent”
aiming to minimize the policymaker’s expected welfare.3 In the robust control context, the
policymaker maximizes her expected discounted welfare subject to facing the evil agent’s
2In variational preferences, θ1 and the relative entropy function are consolidated into a general function
called the ambiguity index.
3The optimal policy is independent of the order of the maximization and minimization.
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Table 2: Relative errors between GAMS solution and the dynamic programming solution to
the DICE-2007 model on the domain used in this paper.
Abatement Rate Consumption Investment Temperature CO2
Maximum Relative Error 6.4× 10−4 1.5× 10−3 9.6× 10−3 9.2× 10−4 1.1× 10−3
Average Relative Error 1.2× 10−3 8.9× 10−4 8.7× 10−4 6.2× 10−4 6.9× 10−4
distorted model. How much the model is distorted by the evil agent is modulated by the
size of the penalty parameter θ1. Higher θ1’s’ increase the evil agent’s penalty for selecting a
model much different than the approximating model and in the limit the evil agent’s selection
is the same as the approximating model since any non-zero relative entropy carries an infinite
penalty. Conversely, decreasing θ1 reduces the evil agent’s cost of selecting larger distortions
in terms of their relative entropy. Effectively, the penalty parameter governs the size of the
cloud of models around her approximating models she deems as plausible alternatives. As
shown in Hansen and Sargent (2007), the evil agent’s optimal selection can be represented
by a risk sensitivity operator,
T 1(Vt+1(St+1)|θ1) = −θ1log
(
ESt+1
[
exp
(
−Vt+1(St+1)
θ1
)])
.
If θ1 =∞ the risk sensitivity operator reduces to the standard expected continuation value,
but if θ1 <∞, then the distribution underlying the future value is twisted by the evil agent’s
distortion. The risk sensitivity operator is decreasing in θ1, so smaller selections result in
lower (perceived) future welfare. This induces the policymaker to design policy as if she is
facing worse futures and helps her guard against unknown misspecifications.
C Error Analysis
I examine the error in the value function approximation by comparing the solution to the
standard DICE-2007 model using the dynamic programming model and compare it against
the solution reported by Nordhaus which was computed in GAMS. I report the dynamic
programming solution when using the same collocation domain as the main results. To
make an apples-to-apples comparison, I change the GAMS code so that the model is Markov.
The standard DICE-2007 model has time t forcing as a function of the average of times t
and t + 1 atmospheric CO2. I alter the code so that it is instead just a function of time t
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Table 3: Average and maximum first-order condition errors of 200 year simulations for each
framework. The average and maximum trajectory errors are averaged over draws of d1,
damage shock vectors, and an equal weighting across all four damage functional forms in the
main text.
Uncertainty Learning Robust Robust Control and Learning
Maximum Error 6.6× 10−4 6.6× 10−4 6.8× 10−4 6.8× 10−4
Average Error 1.0× 10−4 1.0× 10−4 1.2× 10−4 1.0× 10−4
atmospheric CO2. Relative errors between the two approaches for policy trajectories, and
surface temperature and atmospheric CO2 trajectories, are reported in Table 2.
The optimal abatement, consumption and investment policies are all very close to the
GAMS solution, with differences generally on the order of tenths to hundredths of a percent.
Given the high accuracy of the optimal policies, the trajectories for surface temperature and
atmospheric CO2 are also accurate and generally have errors on the order of hundredths of
a percent compared to the GAMS solution.
Next I investigate internal consistency of the model by calculating the errors in simulated
policy trajectories. Tables 3 displays the maximum and average errors of the simulated
trajectories’ first-order conditions (FOCs). Time t errors in a given simulation run are
defined as the infinity norm of the absolute error in the first-order conditions. Along each
200 year trajectory, the maximum and average error is then taken. These are then averaged
over 20000 simulations: 5000 for each damage functional form examined in the main text.
Average errors for all frameworks are on the order of 10−4, while the maximum error over
all the simulations for a given framework is six times larger but still small.
D Sensitivity Analysis of the Prior and Shock Distri-
butions
Figure 1 depicts the mean optimal carbon taxes for the uncertainty and learning frameworks
when the damage function has been correctly specified by the policymaker, but when facing
different variances of the prior and shock to examine the sensitivity of policies to these
choices. The means of the two distributions are still held to the values in the main text. The
top row shows the taxes for the uncertainty framework and the bottom row shows the taxes
for the learning framework. The left column shows taxes when the shock shape parameter
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has been altered by ±50 percent, which correspond to approximately a doubling or halving
of the variance. The right column shows trajectories when the prior variance is varied by
±50 percent.
Varying the prior has very little impact for either the uncertainty or learning frameworks
since learning occurs quickly with conjugate prior Bayesian updating, and a larger variance
on the prior does not have substantial long run effects. Having a higher variance prior results
in a minutely smaller carbon tax since higher variance in damages results in higher expected
output and welfare. Altering the shock variance for the uncertainty framework again has a
very small effect that works in the same way as altering the prior variance.
Altering the shock variance does have a slightly larger effect when learning, but the
effect is negligible until the end of the first century where it about $1/tCO2. Altering
the shock distribution also does not affect the qualitative results regarding the optimal tax
decomposition and ex-post welfare.
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Figure 1: Optimal tax trajectories for the uncertainty (tow row) and learning (bottom
row) frameworks when altering the damage shock shape parameter by ±50 percent which
approximately doubles and halves the variance (left column) and altering the prior variance
by ±50 percent.
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